Escaping the tragedy of the commons through targeted punishment

dc.contributor.author	Johnson, Samuel	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2016-06-25T01:57:00Z
dc.date.available	2016-06-25T01:57:00Z
dc.date.issued	2015	en_US
dc.identifier.other	HPU4160286	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://lib.hpu.edu.vn/handle/123456789/21665
dc.description.abstract	Failures of cooperation cause many of society’s gravest problems. It is well known that cooperation among many players faced with a social dilemma can be maintained thanks to the possibility of punishment, but achieving the initial state of widespread cooperation is often much more difficult. We show here that there exist strategies of ‘targeted punishment’ whereby a small number of punishers can shift a population of defectors into a state of global cooperation. We conclude by outlining how the international community could use a strategy of this kind to combat climate change	en_US
dc.format.extent	9 p.	en_US
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	The Royal Society	en_US
dc.subject	Mathematics	en_US
dc.subject	Appliedmathematics	en_US
dc.subject	Statistical	en_US
dc.subject	Physics	en_US
dc.subject	Environmental science	en_US
dc.subject	Cooperation	en_US
dc.subject	Social dilemma	en_US
dc.subject	Climate change	en_US
dc.title	Escaping the tragedy of the commons through targeted punishment	en_US
dc.type	Book	en_US
dc.size	719KB	en_US
dc.department	Education	en_US